Influence in Classification via Cooperative Game Theory by Datta, Amit et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
50
5.
00
03
6v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  3
0 A
pr
 20
15
Influence in Classification via Cooperative Game
Theory
Amit Datta, Anupam Datta, Ariel D. Procaccia and Yair Zick
Carnegie Mellon University
amitdatta,danupam@cmu.edu
arielpro,yairzick@cs.cmu.edu
Abstract
A dataset has been classified by some unknown classifier into two types of
points. What were the most important factors in determining the classification
outcome? In this work, we employ an axiomatic approach in order to uniquely
characterize an influence measure: a function that, given a set of classified points,
outputs a value for each feature corresponding to its influence in determining the
classification outcome. We show that our influence measure takes on an intuitive
form when the unknown classifier is linear. Finally, we employ our influence mea-
sure in order to analyze the effects of user profiling on Google’s online display
advertising.
1 Introduction
A recent white house report [Podesta et al., 2014] highlights some of the major risks in
the ubiquitous use of big data technologies. According to the report, one of the major
issues with large scale data collection and analysis is a glaring lack of transparency. For
example, a credit reporting company collects consumer data from third parties, and uses
machine learning analysis to estimate individuals’ credit score. On the one hand, this
method is “impartial”: an emotionless algorithm cannot be accused of being malicious
(discriminatory behavior is not hard-coded). However, it is hardly transparent; indeed,
it is difficult to tease out the determinants of one’s credit score: it depends on the
user’s financial activities, age, address, the behavior of similar users and many other
factors. This is a major issue: big-data analysis does not intend to discriminate, but
inadvertent discrimination does occur: treating users differently based on unfair criteria
(e.g. online retailers offering different discounts or goods based on place of residence
or past purchases).
In summary, big data analysis leaves users vulnerable. They may be discrimi-
nated against, and no one (including the algorithm’s developers!) may even know why;
what’s worse, traditional methods for preserving user anonymity (e.g. by “opting out”
of data collection) offer little protection; big data techniques allow companies to infer
individuals’ data based on similar users [Barocas and Nissenbaum, 2014]. Since it is
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often difficult to “pop the hood” and understand the inner workings of classification
algorithms, maintaining transparency in classification is a major challenge. In more
concrete terms, transparency can be interpreted as understanding what influences the
decisions of a black-box classifier. This is where our work comes in.
Suppose that we are given a dataset B of users; here, every user a ∈ B can be
thought of as a vector of features (e.g. a = (age, gender, IP address . . . )), where the
i-th coordinate of a corresponds to the state of the i-th feature. Each a has a value
v(a) (say, the credit score of a). We are interested in the following question: given a
dataset B of various feature vectors and their values, how influential was each feature
in determining these values?
In more detail, given a set N = {1, . . . , n} of features, a dataset B of feature
profiles, where every profile a has a value v(a), we would like to compute a measure
φi(N,B, v) that corresponds to feature i’s importance in determining the labels of the
points inB. We see this work as an important first step towards a concrete methodology
for transparency analysis of big-data algorithms.
Our Contribution: We take an axiomatic approach — which draws heavily on co-
operative game theory — to define an influence measure. The merit of our approach
lies in its independence of the underlying structure of the classification function; all we
need is to collect data on its behavior.
We show that our influence measure is the unique measure satisfying some natural
properties (Section 2). As a case study, we show that when the input values are given
by a linear classifier, our influence measure has an intuitive geometric interpretation
(Section 3). Finally, we show that our axioms can be extended in order to obtain other
influence measures (Section 4). For example, our axioms can be used to obtain a
measure of state influence, as well as influence measures where a prior distribution on
the data is assumed, or a measure that uses pseudo-distance between user profiles to
measure influence.
We complement our theoretical results with an implementation of our approach,
which serves as a proof of concept (Section 5). Using our framework, we identify ads
where certain user features have a significant influence on whether the ad is shown to
users. Our experiments show that our influence measures behave in a desirable manner.
In particular, a Spanish language ad — clearly biased towards Spanish speakers —
demonstrated the highest influence of any feature among all ads.
1.1 Related Work
Axiomatic characterizations have played an important role in the design of provably
fair revenue divisions [Shapley, 1953; Young, 1985; Banzhaf, 1965; Lehrer, 1988].
Indeed, one can think of the setting we describe as a generalization of cooperative
games, where agents can have more than one state — in cooperative games, agents are
either present or absent from a coalition. Some papers extend cooperative games to
settings where agents have more than one state, and define influence measures for such
settings [Chalkiadakis et al., 2010; Zick et al., 2014]; however, our setting is far more
general.
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Our definition of influence measures the ability of a feature to affect the classifi-
cation outcome if changed (e.g. how often does a change in gender cause a change in
the display frequency of an ad); this idea is used in the analysis of cause [Halpern and
Pearl, 2005; Tian and Pearl, 2000], and responsibility [Chockler and Halpern, 2004];
our influence measure can be seen as an application of these ideas to a classification
setting.
Influence measures are somewhat related to feature selection [Blum and Langley,
1997]. Feature selection is the problem of finding the set of features that are most rel-
evant to the classification task, in order to improve the performance of a classifier on
the data; that is, it is the problem of finding a subset of features, such that if we train
a classifier using just those features, the error rate is minimized. Some of the work on
feature selection employs feature ranking methods; some even use the Shapley value
as a method for selecting the most important features [Cohen et al., 2005]. Our work
differs from feature selection both in its objectives and its methodology. Our measures
can be used in order to rank features, but we are not interested in training classifiers;
rather, we wish to decide which features influence the decision of an unknown classi-
fier. That said, one can certainly employ our methodology in order to rank features in
feature selection tasks.
When the classifier is linear, our influence measures take on a particularly intu-
itive interpretation as the aggregate volume between two hyperplanes [Marichal and
Mossinghoff, 2006].
Recent years have seen tremendous progress on methods to enhance fairness in
classification [Dwork et al., 2012; Kamishima et al., 2011], user privacy [Balebako et
al., 2012; Pedreschi et al., 2008; Wills and Tatar, 2012] and the prevention of discrim-
ination [Kamiran and Calders, 2009; Calders and Verwer, 2010; Luong et al., 2011].
Our work can potentially inform all of these research thrusts: a classifier can be deemed
fair if the influence of certain features is low; for example, high gender influence may
indicate discrimination against a certain gender. In terms of privacy, if a hidden feature
(i.e. one that is not part of the input to the classifier) has high influence, this indicates
a possible breach of user privacy.
2 Axiomatic Characterization
We begin by briefly presenting our model. Given a set of features N = {1, . . . , n},
let Ai be the set of possible values, or states that feature i can take; for example, the
i-th feature could be gender, in which case Ai = {male, female, other}. We are given
partial outputs of a function over a dataset containing feature profiles. That is, we are
given a subsetB ofA =
∏
i∈N Ai, and a valuation v(a) for every a ∈ B. By given, we
mean that we do not know the actual structure of v, but we know what values it takes
over the dataset B. Formally, our input is a tuple G = 〈N,B, v〉, where v : A → Q
is a function assigning a value of v(a) to each data point a ∈ B. We refer to G as the
dataset. When v(a) ∈ {0, 1} for all a ∈ B, v is a binary classifier. When B = A
and |Ai| = 2 for all i ∈ N , the dataset corresponds to a standard TU cooperative
game [Chalkiadakis et al., 2011] (and is a simple game if v(a) ∈ {0, 1}).
We are interested in answering the following question: how influential is feature
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i? Our desired output is a measure φi(G) that will be associated with each feature i.
The measure φi(G) should be a good metric of the importance of i in determining the
values of v over B.
Our goal in this section is to show that there exists a unique influence measure
that satisfies certain natural axioms. We begin by describing the axioms, starting with
symmetry.
Given a dataset G = 〈N,B, v〉 and a bijective mapping σ from N to itself, we
define σG = 〈σN, σB, σv〉 in the natural way: σN has all of the features relabeled
according to σ (i.e. the index of i is now σ(i)); σB is {σa | a ∈ B}, and σv(σa) =
v(a) for all σa ∈ σB. Given a bijective mapping τ : Ai → Ai over the states of some
feature i ∈ N , we define τG = 〈N, τB, τv〉 in a similar manner.
Definition 2.1. An influence measure φ satisfies the feature symmetry property if it
is invariant under relabelings of features: given a dataset G = 〈N,B, v〉 and some
bijection σ : N → N , φi(G) = φσ(i)(σG) for all i ∈ N . A influence measure φ
satisfies the state symmetry property if it is invariant under relabelings of states: given a
dataset G = 〈N,B, v〉, some i ∈ N , and some bijection τ : Ai → Ai, φj(G) = φj(τG)
for all j ∈ N . Note that it is possible that i 6= j. A measure satisfying both state and
feature symmetry is said to satisfy the symmetry axiom (Sym).
Feature symmetry is a natural extension of the symmetry axiom defined for coop-
erative games (see e.g. [Banzhaf, 1965; Lehrer, 1988; Shapley, 1953]). However, state
symmetry does not make much sense in classic cooperative games; it would translate
to saying that for any set of players S ⊆ N and any j ∈ N , the value of i is the same
if we treat S as S \ {j}, and S \ {j} as S. While in the context of cooperative games
this is rather uninformative, we make non-trivial use of it in what follows.
We next describe a sufficient condition for a feature to have no influence: a feature
should not have any influence if it does not affect the outcome in any way. Formally, a
feature i ∈ N is a dummy if v(a) = v(a−i, b) for all a ∈ B, and all b ∈ Ai such that
(a−i, b) ∈ B.
Definition 2.2. An influence measure φ satisfies the dummy property if φi(G) = 0
whenever i is a dummy in the dataset G.
The dummy property is a standard extension of the dummy property used in value
characterizations in cooperative games. However, when dealing with real datasets, it
may very well be that there is no vector a ∈ B such that (a−i, b) ∈ B; this issue is
discussed further in Section 6.
Cooperative game theory employs a notion of value additivity in the characteriza-
tion of both the Shapley and Banzhaf values. Given two datasets G1 = 〈N,B, v1〉,G2 =
〈N,B, v2〉, we define G = 〈N,A, v〉 = G1 + G2 with v(a) = v1(a) + v2(a) for all
a ∈ B.
Definition 2.3. An influence measure φ satisfies additivity (AD) if φi(G1 + G2) =
φi(G1) + φi(G2) for any two datasets G1 = 〈N,B, v1〉,G2 = 〈N,B, v2〉.
The additivity axiom is commonly used in the axiomatic analysis of revenue di-
vision in cooperative games (see [Lehrer, 1988; Shapley, 1953]); however, it fails to
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capture a satisfactory notion of influence in our more general setting. We now show
that any measure that satisfies additivity, in addition to the symmetry and dummy prop-
erties, must evaluate to zero for all features. To show this, we first define the following
simple class of datasets.
Definition 2.4. Let Ua = 〈N,A, ua〉 be the dataset defined by the classifier ua, where
ua(a
′) = 1 if a′ = a, and is 0 otherwise. The dataset Ua is referred to as the singleton
dataset over a.
It is an easy exercise to show that additivity implies that for any scalar α ∈ Q,
φi(αG) = αφi(G), where the dataset αG has the value of every point scaled by a factor
of α.
Proposition 2.5. Any influence measure that satisfies the (Sym), (D) and (AD) axioms
evaluates to zero for all features.
Proof. First, we show that for any a, a′ ∈ A and any b ∈ Ai, it must be the case that
φi(U(a−i,b)) = φi(U(a′−i,b)). This is true because we can define a bijective mapping
fromU(a−i,b) to U(a′−i,b): for every j ∈ N \{i}, we swap aj and a
′
j . By state symmetry,
φi(U(a−i,b)) = φi(U(a′−i,b)).
Next, if φ is additive, then for any dataset G = 〈N,B, v〉, φi(G) =
∑
a∈B v(a)φi(Ua).
That is, the influence of a feature must be the sum of its influenceover singleton
datasets, scaled by v(a).
Now, suppose for contradiction that there exists some singleton dataset Ua¯ (a¯ ∈ B)
for which some feature i ∈ N does not have an influence of zero. That is, we assume
that φi(Ua¯) 6= 0. We define a dataset G = 〈N,A, v〉 in the following manner: for all
a ∈ A such that a−i = a¯−i, we set v(a) = 1, and v(a) = 0 if a−i 6= a¯−i. In the
resulting dataset, v(a) is solely determined by the values of features in N \{i}; in other
words v(a) = v(a−i, b) for all b ∈ Ai, hence feature i is a dummy. According to the
dummy axiom, we must have that φi(G) = 0; however,
0 = φi(G) =
∑
a:v(a)=1
φi(Ua) =
∑
b∈Ai
φi(U(a¯−i,b))
=
∑
b∈Ai
φi(Ua¯) = |Ai|φi(Ua¯) > 0,
where the first equality follows from the decomposition of G into singleton datasets,
and the third equality holds by Symmetry. This is a contradiction.
As Proposition 2.5 shows, the additivity, symmetry and dummy properties do not
lead to a meaningful description of influence. A reader familiar with the axiomatic
characterization of the Shapley value [Shapley, 1953] will find this result rather dis-
appointing: the classic characterizations of the Shapley and Banzhaf values assume
additivity (that said, The axiomatization by Young [1985] does not assume additivity).
We now show that there is an influence measure uniquely defined by an alternative
axiom, which echoes the union intersection property described by Lehrer [1988]. In
what follows, we assume that all datasets are classified by a binary classifier. We write
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W (B) to be the set of all profiles in B such that v(a) = 1, and L(B) to be the set of all
profiles in B that have a value of 0. We refer to W (B) as the winning profiles in B, and
to L(B) as the losing profiles in B. We can thus write φi(W (B), L(B)), rather than
φi(G). Given two disjoint setsW,L ⊆ A, we can define the dataset as G = 〈W,L〉, and
the influence of i as φi(W,L), without explicitly writing N,B and v. As we have seen,
no measure can satisfy the additivity axiom (as well as symmetry and dummy axioms)
without being trivial. We now propose an alternative influence measure, captured by
the following axiom:
Definition 2.6. An influence measure φ satisfies the disjoint union (DU) property if for
any Q ⊆ A, and any disjoint R,R′ ⊆ A \Q, φi(Q,R) + φi(Q,R′) = φi(Q,R ∪R′),
and φi(R,Q) + φi(R′, Q) = φi(R ∪R′, Q).
An influence measure φ satisfying the (DU) axiom is additive with respect to in-
dependent observations of the same type. Suppose that we are given the outputs of a
binary classifier on two datasets: G1 = 〈W,L1〉 and G2 = 〈W,L2〉. The (DU) axiom
states that the ability of a feature to affect the outcome on G1 is independent of its
ability to affect the outcome in G2, if the winning states are the same in both datasets.
Replacing additivity with the disjoint union property yields a unique influence mea-
sure, with a rather simple form.
χi(G) =
∑
a∈B
∑
b∈Ai:(a−i,b)∈B
|v(a−i, b)− v(a)| (1)
χ measures the number of times that a change in the state of i causes a change in the
classification outcome. If we normalize χ and divide by |B|, the resulting measure has
the following intuitive interpretation: pick a vector a ∈ B uniformly at random, and
count the number of points in Ai for which (a−i, b) ∈ B and i changes the value of a.
We note that when all features have two states and B = A, χ coincides with the (raw)
Banzhaf power index [Banzhaf, 1965].
We now show that χ is a unique measure satisfying (D), (Sym) and (DU). We begin
by presenting the following lemma, which characterizes influence measures satisfying
(D), (Sym) and (DU) when dataset contains only a single feature.
Lemma 2.7. Let φ be an influence measure that satisfies state symmetry, and let G1 =
〈{i}, Ai, v1〉 and G2 = 〈{i}, Ai, v2〉 be two datasets with a single feature i; if the
number of winning states under G1 and G2 is identical, then φi(G1) = φi(G2).
Proof Sketch. We simply construct a bijective mapping from the winning states of i
under G1 and its winning states in G2. By state symmetry, φi(G1) = φi(G2).
Lemma 2.7 implies that for single feature games, the value of a feature only de-
pends on the number of winning states, rather than their identity.
We are now ready to show the main theorem for this section: χ is the unique influ-
ence measure satisfying the three axioms above, up to a constant factor.
Theorem 2.8. An influence measure φ satisfies (D), (Sym) and (DU) if and only if there
exists a constant C such that for every dataset G = 〈N,B, v〉
φi(G) = C · χi(G).
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Proof. It is an easy exercise to verify that χ satisfies the three axioms, so we focus on
the “only if” direction.
We present our proof assuming that we are given the set A as data; the proof goes
through even if we assume that we are presented with some arbitrary B ⊆ A. Let us
write W = W (A) and L = L(A). Given some a−i ∈ A−i, we write La−i = {a¯ ∈ L |
a−i = a¯−i}, and Wa−i = {a¯ ∈W | a−i = a¯−i}.
Using the disjoint union property, we can decompose φi(W,L) as follows:
φi(W,L) =
∑
a−i∈A−i
∑
a¯−i∈A−i
φi(Wa−i , La¯−i). (2)
Now, if a¯−i 6= a−i, then feature i is a dummy given the dataset provided. Indeed,
state profiles are either in Wa−i or in La¯−i ; that is, if v(a−i, b) = 0, then (a−i, b) is
unobserved, and if v(a¯−i, b) = 1, then (a¯−i, b) is unobserved. We conclude that
φi(W,L) =
∑
a−i∈A−i
φi(Wa−i , La−i). (3)
Let us now consider φi(Wa−i , La−i). Since φ satisfies state symmetry, Lemma 2.7
implies that φi can only possibly depend on a−i, |Wa−i | and |La−i |. Next, for any
a−i and a′−i such that |La−i | = |La′
−i
| and |Wa−i | = |Wa′
−i
|, so by Lemma 2.7
φi(Wa−i , La−i) = φi(Wa′
−i
, La′
−i
). In other wordsφi only depends on |Wa−i |, |La−i|,
and not on the identity of a−i.
Thus, one can see φi for a single feature as a function of two parameters, w and
l in N, where w is the number of winning states and l is the number of losing states.
According to the dummy property, we know that φi(w, 0) = φi(0, l) = 0; moreover,
the disjoint union property tells us that φi(x, l) + φi(y, l) = φi(x + y, l), and that
φi(w, x) + φi(w, y) = φi(w, x+ y). We now show that φi(w, l) = φi(1, 1)wl.
Our proof is by induction on w + l. For w + l = 2 the claim is clear. Now, assume
without loss of generality that w > 1 and l ≥ 1; then we can write w = x + y for
x, y ∈ N such that 1 ≤ x, y < w. By our previous observation,
φi(w, l) = φi(x, l) + φi(y, l)
i.h.
= φi(1, 1)xl + φi(1, 1)yl = φi(1, 1)wl.
Now, φi(1, 1) is the influence of feature i when there is exactly one losing state profile,
and one winning state profile. We write φi(1, 1) = ci.
Let us write Wi(a−i) = {b ∈ Ai | v(a−i, b) = 1} and Li(a−i) = Ai \Wi(a−i).
Thus, |Wa−i | = |Wi(a−i)|, and |La−i | = |Li(a−i)|. Putting it all together, we get that
φi(G) = ci
∑
a−i∈A−i
|Wi(a−i)| · |Li(a−i)| (4)
We just need to show that the measure given in (4) equals χi (modulo ci). Indeed, (4)
equals
∑
a∈A: v(a)=0 |Wi(a−i)|, which in turn equals
∑
a∈A: v(a)=0
∑
b∈Ai
|v(a−i, b)−
v(a)|. Similarly, (4) equals ∑
a∈A:v(a)=1
∑
b∈Ai
|v(a−i, b)− v(a)|.
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Thus, ∑
a−i∈A−i
|Wi(a−i)| · |Li(a−i)| =
1
2
∑
a∈A
∑
b∈Ai
|v(a−i, b)− v(a)|;
in particular, for every dataset G = 〈N,A, v〉 and every i ∈ N , there is some con-
stant Ci such that φi(G) = Ciχi(G). To conclude the proof, we must show that
Ci = Cj for all i, j ∈ N . Let σ : N → N be the bijection that swaps i and j;
then φi(G) = φσ(i)(σG). By feature symmetry, Ciχi(G) = φi(G) = φσ(i)(σG) =
φj(σG) = Cjχj(σG) = Cjχi(G), thus Ci = Cj .
3 Case Study: Influence for Linear Classifiers
To further ground our results, we now present their application to the class of linear
classifiers. For this class of functions, our influence measure takes on an intuitive
interpretation.
A linear classifier is defined by a hyperplane in Rn; all points that are on one side
of the hyperplane are colored blue (in our setting, have value 1), and all points on the
other side are colored red (have a value of 0). Formally, we associate a weight wi ∈ R
with every one of the features in N (we assume that wi 6= 0 for all i ∈ N ); a point
x ∈ Rn is blue if x · w ≥ q, where q ∈ R is a given parameter. The classification
function v : Rn → {0, 1} is given by
v(x) =
{
1 if x ·w ≥ q
0 otherwise.
(5)
Fixing the value of xi to some b ∈ R, let us consider the set Wi(b) = {x−i ∈
Rn−1 | v(x−i, b) = 1}; we observe that if b < b′ and wi > 0, then Wi(b) ⊂Wi(b′) (if
wi < 0 then Wi(b′) ⊂Wi(b)). Given two values b, b′ ∈ R, we denote by
Di(b, b
′) = {x−i ∈ R
n−1 | v(x−i, b) 6= v(x−i, b
′)}.
By our previous observation, if b < b′ then Di(b, b′) = Wi(b′) \Wi(b), and if b > b′
then Di(b, b′) = Wi(b) \Wi(b′).
Suppose that rather than taking points in Rn, we only take points in [0, 1]n; then
we can define |Di(b, b′)| = Vol(Di(b, b′)), where
Vol(Di(b, b
′)) =
∫
x−i∈[0,1]n−1
|v(x−i, b
′)− v(x−i, b)|∂x−i.
In other words, in order to measure the total influence of setting the state of fea-
ture i to b, we must take the total volume of Di(b, b′) for all b′ ∈ [0, 1], which
equals
∫ 1
b′=0
Vol(Di(b, b
′))∂b. Thus, the total influence of setting the state of i to b
is
∫
x∈[0,1]n |v(x−i, b) − v(x)|∂x. The total influence of i would then be naturally the
total influence of its states, i.e.∫ 1
b=0
∫
x∈[0,1]n
|v(x−i, b)− v(x)|∂x∂b. (6)
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The formula in Equation (6) is denoted by χi(w; q). Equation (1) is a discretized
version of Equation (6); the results of Section 2 can be extended to the continuous
setting, with only minimal changes to the proofs.
We now show that the measure given in (6) agrees with the weights in some natural
manner. This intuition is captured in Theorem 3.1 (proof omitted).
Theorem 3.1. Let v be a linear classifier defined by w and q; then χi(G) ≥ χj(G) if
and only if |wi| ≥ |wj |.
Given Theorem 3.1, one would expect the following to hold: suppose that we are
given two weight vectors, w,w′ ∈ Rn such that wj = w′j for all j 6= i, but wi < w′i.
Let v be the linear classifier defined by w and q and v′ be the linear classifier defined
by w′ and q. Is it the case that feature i is more influential under v′ than under v?
In other words, does influence monotonicity hold when we increase the weight of an
individual feature? The answer to this is negative.
Example 3.2. Let us consider a single feature game where N = {1}, A1 = [0, 1], and
v(x) = 1 if wx ≥ q, and v(x) = 0 if wx < q for a given w > q. The fraction of times
that 1 is pivotal is
|Piv1| =
∫ 1
b=0
∫ 1
x=0
I(v(b)=1 ∧ v(x)=0)∂x∂b;
simplifying, this expression is equal to
(
1− q
w
)
q
w
. We can show that χ1 = 2|Piv1| ,
we have that χ1 is maximized when q = 2w; in particular, χ1 is monotone increasing
when q < w ≤ 2q, and it is monotone decreasing when w ≥ 2q.
Example 3.2 highlights the following phenomenon: fixing the other features to be
a−i, the influence of i is maximized when |La−i | = |Wa−i |. This can be interpreted
probabilistically: we sample a random feature from B, and assume that for any fixed
a−i ∈ A−i, Pr[v(a−i, b) = 1] =
1
2 . The better a feature i agrees with our assumption,
the more i is rewarded. More generally, an influence measure satisfies the agreement
with prior assumption (APA) axiom if for any vector (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ [0, 1]n, and any
fixed a−i ∈ A−i, i’s influence increases as |Pr[v(a−i, b) = 1]− pi| decreases. A vari-
ant of the symmetry axiom (that reflects changes in probabilities when labels change),
along with the dummy and disjoint union axioms can give us a weighted influence
measure as described in Section 4.2, that also satisfies the (APA) axiom.
4 Extensions of the Feature Influence Measure
Section 2 presents an axiomatic characterization of feature influence, where the value
of each feature vector is either zero or 1. We now present a few possible extensions of
the measure, and the variations on the axioms that they require.
4.1 State Influence
Section 2 provided an answer to questions of the following form: what is the impact
of gender on classification outcomes? The answer provided in previous sections was
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that influence was a function of the feature’s ability to change outcomes by changing
its state.
It is also useful to ask a related question: what is the impact of the gender feature
being set to “female” on classification outcomes? In other words, rather than measuring
feature influence, we are measuring the influence of feature i being in a certain state.
The results described in Section 2 can be easily extended to this setting. Moreover,
the impossibility result described in Proposition 2.5 no longer holds when we measure
state — rather than feature — influence: we can replace the disjoint union property
with additivity to obtain an alternative classification of state influence.
4.2 Weighted Influence
Suppose that in addition to the dataset B, we are given a weight function w : B → R.
w(a) can be thought of as the number of occurrences of the vector a in the dataset,
the probability that a appears, or some intrinsic importance measure of a. Note that
in Section 2 we implicitly assume that all points occur at the same frequency (are
equally likely) and are equally important. A simple extension of the disjoint union
and symmetry axioms to a weighted variant shows that the only weighted influence
measure that satisfies these axioms is
χwi (B) =
∑
a∈B
∑
b∈Ai:(a−i,b)∈B
w(a)|v(a−i, b)− v(a)|.
4.3 General Distance Measures
Suppose that instead of a classifier v : A → {0, 1} we are given a pseudo-distance
measure: that is, a function d : A×A→ R that satisfies d(a, a′) = d(a′, a), d(a, a) =
0 and the triangle inequality. Note that it is possible that d(a, a′) = 0 but a 6= a′. An
axiomatic analysis in such general settings is possible, but requires more assumptions
on the behavior of the influence measure. Such an axiomatic approach leads us to show
that the influence measure
χdi (B) =
∑
a∈B
∑
b∈Ai:(a−i,b)∈B
d((a−i, b), a)
is uniquely defined via some natural axioms. The additional axioms are a simple ex-
tension of the disjoint union property, and a minimal requirement stating that when
B = {a, (a−i, b)}, then the influence of a feature is αd((a−i, b), a) for some constant
α independent of i. The extension to pseudo-distances proves to be particularly useful
when we conduct empirical analysis of Google’s display ads system, and the effects
user metrics have on display ads.
5 Implementation
We implement our influence measure to study Google’s display advertising system.
Users can set demographics (like gender or age) on the Google Ad Settings page1;
1google.com/settings/ads
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these are used by the Google ad serving algorithm to determine which ads to serve. We
apply our influence measure to study how demographic settings influence the targeted
ads served by Google. We use the AdFisher tool Datta et al. [2014] for automating
browser activity and collect ads.
We pick the set of features: N = {gender, age, language}. Feature states are
{male, female} for gender, {18−24, 35−44, 55−64} for age, and {English, Spanish}
for language; this gives us 2 × 3 × 2 = 12 possible user profiles. Using AdFisher,
we launch twelve fresh browser instances, and assign each one a random user profile.
For each browser instance, the corresponding settings are applied on the Ad Settings
page, and Google ads on the BBC news page bbc.com/news are collected. For each
browser, the news page is reloaded 10 times with 5 second intervals.
To eliminate ads differing due to random chance, we collect ads over 100 itera-
tions, each comprising of 12 browser instances, thereby obtaining data for 1200 sim-
ulated users. In order to minimize confounding factors such as location and system
specifications, all browser instances were run from the same stationary Ubuntu ma-
chine. The 1200 browsers received a total of 32, 451 ads (763 unique); in order to
reduce the amount of noise, we focus only on ads that were displayed more than 100
times, leaving a total of 55 unique ads. Each user profile a thus has a frequency
vector of all ads v′(a) ∈ N55, where the kth coordinate is the number of times ad
k appeared for a user profile a. We normalize v′(a) for each ad by the total num-
ber of times that ad appeared. Thus we obtain the final value-vectors by computing
vk(a) =
v′k(a)∑
a
v′
k
(a) , ∀a, ∀k ∈ {1, . . . , 55}.
Since user profile values are vectors, we use the general distance influence measure
described in Section 4.3. The pseudo-distance we use is Cosine similarity: cosd(x,y) =
1 − x·y||x||·||y|| ; this has been used Cosine similarity has been used by Tschantz et al.
[2014] and Guha et al. [2010] to measure similarity between display ads. The influ-
ence measure for gender, age, and language were 0.124, 0.120, and 0.141 respectively;
in other words, no specific feature has a strong influence over ads displayed.
We next turn to measuring feature effects on specific ads. Fixing an ad k, we define
the value of a feature vector to be the number of times that ad k was displayed for users
with that feature vector, and use χ to measure influence.
We compare the influence measures for each attribute across all the ads and identify
the top ads that demonstrate high influence. The ad for which language had the highest
influence (0.167) was a Spanish language ad, which was served only to browsers that
set ‘Spanish’ as their language on the Ad Settings page. Comparing with statistics like
mean and maximum over measures across all features given in Table 1, we can see that
this influence was indeed high.
To conclude, using a general distance measure between two value-vectors, we iden-
tify that language has the highest influence on ads. By using a more fine-grained
distance function, we can single out one ad which demonstrates high influence for
language. While in this case the bias is acceptable, the experiment suggests that our
framework is effective in pinpointing biased or discriminatory ads.
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Statistic Gender Age Language
Max 0.07 0.0663 0.167
Min 0.00683 0.00551 0.00723
Mean 0.0324 0.0318 0.0330
Median 0.0299 0.0310 0.0291
StdDev 0.0161 0.0144 0.024
Table 1: Statistics over influence measures across features.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this work, we analyze influence measures for classification tasks. Our influence
measure is uniquely defined by a set of natural axioms, and is easily extended to other
settings. The main advantage of our approach is the minimal knowledge we have of
the classification algorithm. We show the applicability of our measure by analyzing
the effects of user features on Google’s display ads, despite having no knowledge of
Google’s classification algorithm (which, we suspect, is quite complex).
Dataset classification is a useful application of our methods; however, our work
applies to extensions of TU cooperative games where agents have more than two states
(e.g. OCF games [Chalkiadakis et al., 2010]).
The measure χ is trivially hard to compute exactly, since it generalizes the raw
Banzhaf power index, for which this task is known to be hard [Chalkiadakis et al.,
2011]. That said, both the Shapley and Banzhaf values can be approximated via random
sampling [Bachrach et al., 2010]. It is straightforward to show that random sampling
provides good approximations for χ as well, assuming a binary classifier.
Our results can be extended in several ways. The measure χ is the number of times
a change in a feature’s state causes a change in the outcome. However, a partial dataset
of observations may not contain any pair of vectors a, a′ ∈ B, such that a′ = (a−i, b).
In Section 5, we control the dataset, so we ensure that all feature profiles appear. How-
ever, other datasets would not be as well-behaved. Extending our influence measure
to accommodate non-immediate influence is an important step towards implementing
our results to other classification domains. Indeed, the next step of our work is ana-
lyzing large-scale datasets, in order to better understand the ideas behind our influence
measure.
Finally, our experimental results, while encouraging, are illustrative rather than
informative: they tell us that Google’s display ads algorithm is clever enough to assign
Spanish ads to Spanish speakers. Our experimental results enumerate the number of
displayed ads; this is not necessarily indicative of users’ clickthrough rates. Since our
users are virtual entities, we are not able to measure their clickthrough rates; a broader
experiment, where user profiles correspond to actual human subjects, would provide
better insights into the effects user profiling has on display advertising.
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Appendix:
Influence in Classification
A Proof of Theorem 3.1
We define Piv i(b) = {x ∈ [0, 1]n | v(x) = 1, v(x−i, b) = 0}, to be the set of all piv-
otal vectors (w.r.t. b), and A-Pivi(b) = {x ∈ [0, 1]n | v(x) = 0, v(x−i, b) = 1} to be
the set of all anti-pivotal vectors. We write Piv i =
{
(x, b) ∈ [0, 1]n+1 | x ∈ Piv i(b)
}
and A-Pivi =
{
(x, b) ∈ [0, 1]n+1 | x ∈ A-Pivi(b)
}
. We note thatVol(Piv i) = Vol(A-Pivi).
Given a point (x, b) ∈ Piv i, we know that v(x) = 0 but v(x−i, b) = 1. Therefore, the
point ((x−i, b), xi) is in A-Pivi. We conclude that
χi =
∫ 1
b=0
|Piv i(b)|+ |A-Pivi(b)|∂b
=
∫ 1
b=0
Vol(Piv i(b))∂b+
∫ 1
b=0
Vol(A-Pivi(b))∂b
=Vol(Piv i) +Vol(A-Pivi) = 2Vol(Piv i)
We begin by stating a few technical lemmas. Our objective is to establish some volume-
preserving transformations between vectors for which j is pivotal, and vectors for
which i is pivotal.
Thus, to show that χi ≥ χj whenever wi ≥ wj > 0, it suffices to show that
Vol(Piv i) ≥ Vol(Piv j).
Lemma A.1. Suppose that wi > wj > 0; if x ∈ Piv j(b) \ Piv i(b) then xi > xj .
Proof. First, note that if v(x−j , b) = 1 but v(x) = 0, then xj < b. Now, suppose that
xi ≤ xj ; we show that (x−j , b) ·w ≤ (x−i, b) ·w. Indeed,
(x−j , b) ·w ≤(x−i, b) ·w ⇐⇒
xiwi + bwj ≤xjwj + bwi ⇐⇒
xiwi − xjwj ≤b(wi − wj)
Thus, we just need to show that xiwi − xjwj ≤ b(wi − wj). Since xi ≤ xj , xiwi −
xjwj ≤ xj(wi − wj), and since wi > wj , this is at most b(wi − wj), as required.
This means that if xi ≤ xj then x ∈ Piv i(b), which concludes the first part of the
proof.
Let fij : Rn → Rn be the transformation
fij(x)k =


xi if k = j
xj if k = i
xk otherwise.
Lemma A.2. If x ∈ Piv j(b) \ Piv i(b) then fij(x) /∈ Piv j(b) ∪ A-Pivj(b).
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Proof. First, note that (b − xj)(wi − wj) > 0; this is because b > xj and wi > wj .
This implies that xjwi + bwj < bwi + xjwj . Now, since v(x−i, b) = 0, we know
that bwi + xjwj < q −
∑
k 6=i,j xkwk; therefore, w · (fij(x)−j , b) =
∑
k 6=i,j xkwk +
xjwi + bwj < q, and v(fij(x)−j , b) = 0. This implies that fij(x) /∈ Piv j(b).
Now, (xi − xj)(wi − wj) > 0 since xi > xj by Lemma A.1. Therefore, xjwi +
xiwj < xiwi + xjwj < q −
∑
k 6=i,j xkwk, which implies that w · fij(x) < q, hence
v(fij(x)) = 0. In particular, fij(x) /∈ A-Pivj(b).
Lemma A.3. Suppose wi > wj > 0 and that x ∈ Piv j(b) \ Piv i(b); if fij(x) /∈
Piv i(b) then xi ≥ b > xj .
Proof. Suppose that b > xi > xj . We note that (b− xi)(wi −wj) > 0, which implies
that bwi + xiwj > xiwi + bwj ≥ q −
∑
k 6=i,j xkwk . Hence, w · (fij(x)−i, b) > q,
which implies that fij(x) ∈ Piv i(b). Thus, if fij(x) /∈ Piv i(b), it must be the case
that xi ≥ b > xj .
Given some x ∈ [0, 1]n and some b ∈ [0, 1], we define gij : [0, 1]n×[0, 1]→ [0, 1]n
as follows:
gij(x, b)k =


xj if k = i
b if k = j
xk otherwise.
Lemma A.4. If x ∈ Piv j(b) \ Piv i(b) and fij(x) /∈ Piv i(b), then gij(x, b) ∈
Piv i(xi) \ (Piv j(xi) ∪ A-Pivj(xi)).
Proof. First, we observe that (gij(x, b)−i, xi) = (x−j , b), and that (gij(x, b)−j , xi) =
fij(x). As observed in Lemma A.2, if xi > xj then v(fij(x)) = 0. Therefore,
gij(x, b) /∈ Piv j(xj). Moreover, since x ∈ Piv j(b), v(gij(x, b)) = 1, so gij(x, b) ∈
Piv i(xi). On the other hand, (b− xj)(wi −wj) > 0, so xjwi+ bwj < bwi+ xjwj <
q −
∑
k 6=i,j xkwk, so gij(x, b) ·w < q. This means that gij(x, b) /∈ A-Pivj(xi).
Given a set S ⊆ Rm and a function f : Rm → Rm, we define f(S) = {f(s) |
s ∈ S}. We can extend fij and gij defined above to functions from Rn+1 to Rn+1
as follows. Given a point (x, b) ∈ Rn+1, we define Fij(x, b) = (fij(x), b), and
Gij(x, b) = (gij(x, b), xi). We note that both Fij and Gij merely swap coordinates in
their inputs, thus they preserve distances:
d(Gij(x, b), Gij(y, c)) = d((x, b), (y, c))
for any metric d. Isoperimetric transformations are known to preserve volume: if I :
Rm → Rm is an isoperimetry, then Vol(S) = Vol(I(S)) for any S ⊆ Rm.
Theorem A.5. If wi ≥ wj > 0 then Vol(Piv j) ≤ Vol(Piv i).
Proof. We partition Piv j as follows. We denote
Aij = Piv j ∩ Piv i,
Bij = {(x, b) ∈ Piv j \ Piv i | (fij(x), b) ∈ Piv i} , and
Cij = {(x, b) ∈ Piv j \ Piv i | (fij(x), b) /∈ Piv i} .
16
Clearly, Aij , Bij and Cij partition Piv j .
According to Lemma A.2, Fij(Bij) ⊆ Piv i \ Piv j . Now, let us observe Cij . Ac-
cording to Lemma A.4, Gij(Cij) ⊆ Piv i \ Piv j . It remains to show that Fij(Bij) ∩
Gij(Cij) = ∅. Suppose that there are some (x, b) ∈ Bij , (z, c) ∈ Cij such that
(fij(x), b) = (gij(z, c), zi). This means that (z, c) = ((x−i, b), xi). To prove a contra-
diction, it suffices to show that if (x, b) ∈ Bij then we have that ((x−i, b), xi) /∈ Cij .
In order to be in Cij , it must be the case that fij(x−i, b) /∈ Piv i(xi); we show that
fij(x−i, b) ∈ Piv i(xi). First, let us write fij(x−i, b) = y. We note that yk = xk
for all k 6= i, j, that yj = b, and that yi = xj . Since b > xj , it must be the
case that (b − xj)(wi − wj) > 0, hence bwi + xjwj > xjwi + bwj . Therefore,
w · y < w · (x−i, b). Now, since (x, b) ∈ Piv j \ Piv i, it must be the case that
v(x−i, b) = 0, i.e. that w · (x−i, b) < q. This means that v(y) = 0. We now show that
v(y−i, xi) = 1. Since yi = xj and yj = b, (y−i, xi) = (x−j , b). Since (x, b) ∈ Piv j ,
v(y−i, xi) = v(x−j , b) = 1. Therefore, y ∈ Piv i, and thus ((x−i, b), xi) /∈ Cij . We
conclude that indeed Fij(Bij) ∩Gij(Cij) = ∅.
To conclude,
Vol(Piv j) =Vol(Aij) +Vol(Bij) +Vol(Cij)
=Vol(Aij) +Vol(Fij(Bij)) +Vol(Gij(Cij))
≤Vol(Piv i)
which concludes the proof.
Corollary A.6. Let G = 〈N, [0, 1]n, v〉 be a game where v is a linear separator given
by w and q. If wi ≥ wj > 0 then χi(G) ≥ χj(G).
Corollary A.6 shows that χ is monotone in feature weights. a complementary result
shows that increasing a feature’s weight would result in an increase in influence. Next,
we show that Corollary A.6 holds even when weights are negative.
Lemma A.7. Let G = 〈{1, 2}, [0, 1]2, v〉 be a 2-feature linear separator with w1 ≥ 0
and w2 < 0. Then χ1(G) > χ2(G) if and only if |w1| > |w2|.
Proof. We begin by assuming that q ≥ 0. First, suppose that w1 < q. In that case, for
all (x1, x2) ∈ [0, 1]2, we have x1w1 + x2w2 ≤ x1w1 ≤ w1 < q, so v(x1, x2) = 0 for
all (x1, x2) ∈ [0, 1]2. In particular, χ1(G) = χ2(G) = 0 and we are done.
We now assume that w1 ≥ q. We show that the claim holds by direct computation
of χ1, χ2. We start by computing χ1(G). By definition, χ1(G) equals∫ 1
0
(∫ 1
0
I(v(x1, x2) = 1)∂x1
∫ 1
0
I(v(y1, x2) = 0)∂y1
)
∂x2
which equals∫ 1
0
(∫ 1
0
I(x1 ≥
q − x2w2
w1
)∂x1
∫ 1
0
I(y1 <
q − x2w2
w1
)∂y1
)
∂x2 (7)
The internal integrals in (7) are zero whenever q−x2w2
w1
/∈ [0, 1]. We know that q−x2w2
w1
≥
0 for all x2 ∈ [0, 1]; however, q−x2w2w1 ≤ 1 only when x2 ≤
w1−q
−w2
. This inequality is
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non trivial only if w1−q−w2 ≤ 1. This happens only when q ≥ w1 + w2. Therefore, we
distinguish between two cases; the first case is when q ≥ w1 + w2, and the second is
when q < w1 + w2. In the second case, since q > 0, w1 + w2 > 0 as well, hence
|w1| > |w2|. In the first case we have:
χ1(G) =
∫ w1−q
−w2
0
(
1−
q − x2w2
w1
)(
q − x2w2
w1
)
∂x2
=
(w1 − q)2(2q + w1)
6(−w2)w21
(8)
In the second case we have
χ1(G) =
∫ 1
0
(
1−
q − x2w2
w1
)(
q − x2w2
w1
)
∂x2
=
6q(w1 + w2)− 6q2 − w2(3w1 + 2w2)
6w21
(9)
Now, let us proceed to compute χ2(G). We have that χ2(G) equals∫ 1
0
(∫ 1
0
I(v(x1, x2) = 1)∂x2
∫ 1
0
I(v(x1, y2) = 0)∂y2
)
∂x1
which equals
∫ 1
0
(∫ 1
0
I(x2 ≤
x1w1 − q
−w2
)∂x2
∫ 1
0
I(y2 >
x1w1 − q
−w2
)∂y2
)
∂x1 (10)
Again, the internal integrals in (10) are not zero only if x1w1−q−w2 ∈ [0, 1].
x1w1−q
−w2
≥ 0
if and only if x1 ≥ qw1 , and
x1w1−q
−w2
≤ 1 if and only if x1 ≤ q−w2w1 . This inequality is
non-trivial only if q−w2
w1
< 1, which happens only when q < w1 +w2. Thus, we again
distinguish between the case when q ≥ w1 + w2 and the case when q < w1 + w2. In
the first case, we have
χ2(G) =
∫ 1
q
w1
(
x1w1 − q
−w2
)(
1−
x1w1 − q
−w2
)
∂x2
=
(w1 − q)2(2q − 2w1 − 3w2)
6w22w1
(11)
and in the second case, χ2(G) equals
∫ q−w2
w1
q
w1
(
x1w1 − q
−w2
)(
1−
x1w1 − q
−w2
)
∂x2 =
−w2
6w1
(12)
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Let us compare the values when q ≥ w1 + w2.
χ1(G) ≥χ2(G) ⇐⇒
(w1 − q)2(2q + w1)
6(−w2)w21
≥
(w1 − q)2(2q − 2w1 − 3w2)
6w22w1
⇐⇒
2q + w1
w1
≥
2q − 2w1 − 3w2
−w2
⇐⇒
(−w2)(2q + w1) ≥w1(2q − 2w1 − 3w2) ⇐⇒
w1(w1 + w2) ≥q(w1 + w2) (13)
Thus, (13) holds with equality if w1 = −w2, χ1(G) > χ2(G) if w1 > −w2 (since
w1 > q ≥ 0 by assumption), and χ1(G) < χ2(G) otherwise. For the second case, we
have
χ1(G) ≥χ2(G) ⇐⇒
6q(w1 + w2)− 6q
2 − w2(3w1 + 2w2)
6w21
≥
−w2
6w1
⇐⇒
6q(w1 + w2)− 6q2 − w2(3w1 + 2w2)
w1
≥− w2 ⇐⇒
6q(w1 + w2)− 6q
2 − w2(3w1 + 2w2) ≥(−w2)w1 ⇐⇒
6q(w1 + w2)− 6q
2 − 2w2(w1 + w2) ≥0 ⇐⇒
(3q − w2)(w1 + w2) ≥3q
2 (14)
Now, (14) holds with equality if w1 + w2 = 0, since then q = 0 as well. Finally, if
w1+w2 > 0, then it holds with strict inequality since w1+w2 ≥ q and 3q−w2 > 3q,
and we are done.
Next, let us assume that q < 0. We again directly compute χ1(G) and χ2(G). First,
if w2 ≥ q, then x1w1 + x2w2 ≥ x2w2 ≥ w2 ≥ q for all (x1, x2) ∈ [0, 1]2; hence
χ1(G) = χ2(G) = 0, and the claim trivially holds. We now assume that w2 < q.
Again, we have that χ1(G) equals∫ 1
0
(∫ 1
0
I(x1 ≤
q − x2w2
w1
)∂x1
∫ 1
0
I(y1 >
q − x2w2
w1
)∂y1
)
∂x2 (15)
We need to have q−x2w2
w1
∈ [0, 1]. q−x2w2
w1
≥ 0 if and only if x2 ≥ qw2 . Since w2 < q,
this value is always less than 1. Moreover, q−x2w2
w1
≤ 1 if and only if x2 ≤ q−w1w2 .
This inequality is not trivial only if q−w1
w2
≤ 1, which happens whenever q ≥ w2 +w1.
Thus, when q ≥ w1 + w2, χ1(G) equals
∫ q−w1
w2
q
w2
(
q − x2w2
w1
)(
1−
q − x2w2
w1
)
∂x2 =
w1
−6w2
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and when q < w1 + w2, χ1(G) equals∫ 1
q
w2
(
q − x2w2
w1
)(
1−
q − x2w2
w1
)
∂x2 =
(q − w2)2(2q − 2w2 − 3w1)
6w2w21
For χ2(G), we employ a similar reasoning. First, χ2(G) equals∫ 1
0
(∫ 1
0
I(x2 ≤
x1w1 − q
−w2
)∂x2
∫ 1
0
I(y2 >
x1w1 − q
−w2
)∂y2
)
∂x1 (16)
And again, x1w1−q−w2 ∈ [0, 1] if and only if x1 ≤
q−w2
w1
. Note that since w2 < q,
q−w2
w1
≥ 0. This constraint is only meaningful when q < w1 + w2. Thus, when
q ≥ w1 + w2, we have that χ2(G) equals∫ 1
0
(
x1w1 − q
−w2
)(
1−
x1w1 − q
−w2
)
∂x1 =
−
6q2 − 6q(w1 + w2) + w1(3w2 + 2w1)
6w22
and equals
−
(q − w2)2(2q + w2)
6w22w1
otherwise.
Next, we compare the values we obtained. When q ≥ w1 + w2, we have that
w1 + w2 < 0, and in particular, |w2| > |w1|. Moreover,
−
6q2 − 6q(w1 + w2) + w1(3w2 + 2w1)
6w22
≥
w1
−6w2
⇐⇒
−6q2 + 6q(w1 + w2)− w1(3w2 + 2w1)
−w2
≥w1 ⇐⇒
−6q2 + 6q(w1 + w2)− w1(2w2 + 2w1) ≥0 ⇐⇒
(3q − w1)(w2 + w1) ≥3q
2
Under our assumptions, this inequality holds, and we are done with the first case. For
the second case,
(q − w2)2(2q − 2w2 − 3w1)
6w2w21
≥−
(q − w2)2(2q + w2)
6w22w1
⇐⇒
2w2 + 3w1 − 2q
w1
≥−
2q + w2
−w2
⇐⇒
(−w2)(2w2 + 3w1 − 2q) ≥w1(−2q − w2) ⇐⇒
(−w2)(w1 + w2) ≥(−q)(w1 + w2)
Sincew2 < q, this inequality holds with equality whenw1 = −w2, it is strict whenever
|w1| > |w2|, and the reverse holds when |w1| < |w2|.
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We are now ready to complete the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. We have shown the case where wi ≥ wj ≥ 0 in Theorem A.5.
We have also shown this to be true for two features in Lemma A.7. We just need to show
that Lemma A.7 extends to the case of arbitrary players. Suppose that |wi| > |wj |. Let
us write χi(〈N,w; q〉) to be the influence of i under the linear classifier defined by w
and q. We observe that
χi(〈N,w; q〉) =
∫
x−i,−j
χi(〈{i, j}, (wi, wj); q −
∑
k 6=i,j
xkwk〉)
≥
∫
x−i,−j
χj(〈{i, j}, (wi, wj), q −
∑
k 6=i,j
xkwk〉)
=χj(〈N,w; q〉)
which concludes the proof.
B Proof that χ satisfies (D), (Sym) and (DU)
We show that χ satisfies the three axioms. If v(a−i, b) = v(a) for all a ∈ A and all
b ∈ Ai, then |v(a−i, b) − v(a)| = 0, and in particular, χi(G) = 0; hence, χ satisfies
the dummy property. Suppose we are given a bijection σi : Ai → Ai. We observe that
χi(G) =
1
|A|
∑
a∈A
∑
b∈Ai
|v(a−i, b)− v(a)|
=
1
|A|
∑
a−i∈A−i
∑
b′∈Ai
∑
b∈Ai
|v(a−i, σi(b))− v(a−i, σi(b
′))|
=
1
|A|
∑
a−i∈A−i
∑
b′∈Ai
∑
b∈Ai
|vσi(a−i, b)− vσi (a−i, b
′)|
=
1
|A|
∑
a∈A
∑
b′∈Ai
∑
b∈Ai
|vσi(a−i, b)− vσi(a)| = χi(σiG)
so χ is invariant under permutations of feature states. Similarly, for any bijection σ :
N → N , χi(G) = χσ(i)(σG); therefore, χ satisfies symmetry.
Given a set B ⊆ A and a feature i, let us write Wa¯−i(B) = {a ∈ B | v(a) =
1, a−i = a¯−i}, and La¯−i(B) = {a ∈ B | v(a) = 0, a−i = a¯−i}. We ob-
serve that Wa−i(B) ∩ Wa¯−i(B) = La−i(B) ∩ La¯−i(B) = ∅; moreover, L(B) =⋃
a−i∈A−i
La−i(B) and W (B) =
⋃
a−i∈A−i
Wa−i(B). Now, given some B ⊆ A, let
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us take some W ′ ⊆W (A) \W (B).
χi(W (B), L(B)) =
∑
a∈B
∑
b∈Ai:
(a−i,b)∈B
|v(a−i, b)− v(a)|
=
∑
a∈W (B)
∑
b∈Ai:
(a−i,b)∈B
|v(a−i, b)− v(a)|
+
∑
a∈L(B)
∑
b∈Ai:
(a−i,b)∈B
|v(a−i, b)− v(a)|
Next, we observe that the first summand equals∑
a∈W (B)
∑
b∈Ai:
(a−i,b)∈B
v(a) − v(a−i, b),
which equals ∑
a−i∈A
∑
a∈Wa
−i
(B)
∑
b∈Ai:
(a−i,b)∈B
v(a) − v(a−i, b) (17)
Now, v(a)− v(a−i, b) = 1 if and only if v(a−i, b) = 0; that is, if (a−i, b) ∈ La−i(B).
Thus, Equation (17) equals ∑
a−i∈A
∑
a∈Wa
−i
(B)
|La−i(B)| = (18)
∑
a−i∈A
|Wa−i(B)||La−i(B)|
A similar construction with W ′ shows that
χi(W
′, L(B)) =
∑
a−i∈A−i
|W ′
a−i
| · |La−i(B)|;
since W (B) and W ′ are disjoint, χ satisfies the disjoint union property.
C Relation to Classic Values in TU Cooperative Games
Our work generalizes influence measurement in classic TU cooperative games. We
recall that a cooperative game with transferrable utility is given by a set of players
N = {1, . . . , n}, and a function v : 2N → R, called the characteristic function. A
game is defined by the tuple G = 〈N, v〉. We say that a game G is monotone if for all
S ⊆ T ⊆ N , v(S) ≤ v(T ).
Classic literature identifies two canonical methods of measuring feature influence in
cooperative games, the Shapley value [Shapley, 1953], and the Banzhaf value [Banzhaf,
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1965]. We begin by providing the following definitions. Given a set S ⊆ N and a
player i, we let mi(S) = v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) denote the marginal contribution of i to
S. The value mi(S) simply describes the added benefit of having i join the coalition
S. Let Π(N) be the set of all bijections from N to itself (also called the set of permu-
tations of N ); given some σ ∈ Π(N) We let Pi(σ) = {j ∈ N | σ(j) < σ(i)} be the
set of the predecessors of i under σ. We define mi(σ) = v(Pi(σ) ∪ {i})− v(Pi(σ)).
Definition C.1. The Banzhaf value of a player i ∈ N is given by
βi(G) =
1
2n
∑
S⊆N
mi(S).
The Banzhaf value takes on a simple probabilistic interpretation: if we choose a set
S uniformly at random from N , the Banzhaf value of a player is his expected marginal
contribution to that set.
Rather than uniformly sampling sets, the Shapley value is based on uniformly sam-
pling permutations.
Definition C.2. The Shapley value of a player i ∈ N is given by
ϕi(G) =
1
n!
∑
σ∈Π(N)
v(Pi(σ) ∪ {i})− v(Pi(σ)).
Intuitively, one can think of the Shapley value as the result of the following process.
We randomly pick some order of the players; each player receives a payoff that is equal
to his marginal contribution to his predecessors in the ordering. The Shapley value is
simply the expected payoff a player receives in this scheme.
When we sample sets uniformly at random from N \ {i}, we are heavily biased
towards selecting sets whose size is approximately n/2. When measuring influence
according to the Shapley value, we are no longer biased towards any set size. One can
think of the Shapley value is measuring a player’s expected marginal contribution to
a set S, where S is chosen according to the following process. First, we pick some
k ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} uniformly at random, and then we pick a set of size k uniformly at
random.
We observe that our classification setting is a generalization of TU cooperative
games. Think of each player as a feature that can take on two values: 0 (corresponding
to “absent”), and 1 (corresponding to “present”). An immediate observation is that
ζ coincides with the Banzhaf value for TU cooperative games. Is there some natural
extension of the Shapley value for general classification tasks?
Our work provides a negative answer to this question. We observe that Theo-
rem D.1 states that the only value that satisfies the dummy, symmetry and linearity ax-
ioms is ζ. When reduced to the cooperative game setting, we obtain axioms that were
used to axiomatically characterize both the Shapley and the Banzhaf values [Lehrer,
1988; Shapley, 1953; Young, 1985].
The dummy axiom (Definition 2.2) reduces to the following: a player i ∈ N is a
dummy if for all S ⊆ N , v(S ∪ {i}) = v(S). Thus, the dummy axiom requires that if
a player is a dummy, then his value should be zero.
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The symmetry axiom (Definition 2.1) reduces to the following: given a game G =
〈N, v〉, and some i, j ∈ N , let us define G′ = 〈N, v′〉 as follows: for all S ⊆ N \{i, j},
v′(S) = v(S), and v′(S ∪{i, j}) = v(S ∪{i, j}); however, v′(S ∪{i}) = v(S ∪{j})
and v′(S ∪ {j}) = v(S ∪ {i}). A value φ satisfies symmetry if φi(G) = φj(G′).
Symmetry reduces to saying that if we replace v(S) with v(S \ i) for all S such that
i ∈ S, and replace v(S) with S ∪{i}) for all S such that i /∈ S, then the total influence
of a player (i.e. his influence when being absent plus his influence when present) does
not change.
Additivity as defined in Definition 2.3 is also naturally applied to TU cooperative
games and is equivalent to the definition given in other axiomatic treatments of values
in cooperative games.
It is well-known that both the Banzhaf and Shapley values satisfy the dummy, sym-
metry and additivity axioms, and indeed, Proposition 2.5 applies to them both: the
Banzhaf value (and Shapley) of a player only measures the effect of player i joining
a coalition, but not the effect of him leaving it. These two values, however, sum to 0.
Indeed:
βi,1(G) + βi,0(G) =
1
2n
∑
S⊆N
v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)
+
1
2n
∑
S⊆N
v(S \ {i})− v(S)
=
1
2n
∑
S⊆N\{i}
v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)
+
1
2n
∑
S⊆N\{i}
v(S)− v(S ∪ {i})
=0
Theorem 2.8 characterizes χ as the unique value to satisfy the dummy, symmetry and
disjoint union properties.
Going back to the classification setting, it is easy to see that Definition 2.6 implies
that for C ⊆ A and any two sets B,B′ ⊆ A \ C, φi(B,C) + φi(B′, C) = φi(B ∪
B′, C) + phii(B ∩B′, C).
One can directly interpret the DU property in TU cooperative games. Given a game
G = 〈N, v〉 and a subset B of 2N , both the Shapley and Banzhaf values can be defined
to ignore any elements that are not contained in B. It is easy to see that Theorem 2.8
implies the uniqueness of χ for TU cooperative games, and that it equals the Banzhaf
value. Thus, Theorem 2.8 can be seen as an alternative axiomatization of the Banzhaf
value, this time from the binary classification perspective.
D Axiomatic Approach to State Influence
Section 2 provided an answer to questions of the following form: what is the impact of
gender on classification. The answer provided in previous sections was that influence
was a function of the feature’s ability to change outcomes by changing its state.
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It is also useful to ask a related question: suppose that a certain search engine user
is profiled as a female. What is the influence of this profiling decision? In other words,
rather than measuring feature influence, we are measuring the influence of feature i
being in a certain state.
For a feature i ∈ N and a state b ∈ N , we can ask what is the influence of the state
b, rather than the influence of i. That is, rather than having a value φi(G) for a feature
i ∈ N , we now study the influence of the state b ∈ Ai, i.e. a real value φi,b(G) for each
i ∈ N and b ∈ Ai.
While Proposition 2.5 implies that any feature influence measure that satisfies the
dummy, symmetry and additivity axioms must be trivial, this result does not carry
through to measures of state influence.
Dummy (D): given i ∈ N and b ∈ Ai, we say that α satisifies the dummy property if
whenever v(a−i, b) = v(a) for all a ∈ A, αi,b = 0.
Symmetry (Sym): Two states b, b′ ∈ Ai are symmetric if for all a ∈ A, v(a−i, b) =
v(a−i, b
′). A value α satisfies symmetry if αi,b = αi,b′ whenever b and b′ are
symmetric.
Linearity (L): Given games G1 = 〈N,A, v1〉 and G2 = 〈N,A, v2〉, let us write G =
〈N,A, v〉 where v = v1 + v2. We assume that v1 and v2 are such that v is still
a function with binary values (i.e. if v1(a) = 1 then v2(a) = 0). A value α is
linear if αi,b(G) = αi,b(G1) + αi,b(G2).
Let us define
ζi,b(G) =
1
|A|
∑
a∈A
v(a−i, b)− v(a) (19)
We let ζ¯ denote the value ζ without the normalizing factor 1|A| . We refer to ζ¯ as the raw
version of ζ. In Theorem D.1, we show that ζ¯ is the unique (up to a constant) value
that satisfies the symmetry, dummy and linearity axioms.
Theorem D.1. If a value φ satisfies the (D), (Sym), and (L), then φ = cζ, where c is
an arbitrary constant.
Proof. Let us observe that every game v : A → {0, 1} can be written as the disjoint
sum of unanimity games; namely v =
∑
a∈A:v(a)=1 ua. Thus, it suffices to show that
the claim holds for unanimity games.
Let Ua = 〈N,A, ua〉; we show that φi,b(Ua) equals ζi,b(Ua). First, if b = ai then
ζ¯i,b(Ua) = |Ai| − 1; if b 6= ai, then ζ¯i,b(Ua) = −1. Now, by symmetry, we have that
φi,b(Ua) = φi,b′ (Ua) for all b, b′ 6= ai. If we write φi,b(Ua) = y for all b 6= ai, and
φi,ai(Ua) = x, then according to Proposition 2.5,
∑
b6=ai
y + x = 0, which implies
that x = −y(|Ai| − 1). Finally, according to feature symmetry, the value of y cannot
depend on i, and is equal for all j ∈ N . We conclude that for all i ∈ N and all b ∈ Ai,
φi,b(G) = ζi,b(G).
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As a direct corollary of Theorem A.5, we have that the unique (up to a constant)
state value to satisfy (Sym), (D) and (DU) axioms (see Definitions 2.1, 2.2 and 2.6 in
Section 2) is
χi,b(G) =
∑
a∈A
|v(a−i, b)− v(a)|.
E Influence in Weighted Settings
Unlike previous sections, let us assume that there is some weight function w : A→ R
that assigns a non-negative weight to every state vector. w can be thought of as a
prior distribution that governs the likelihood of observing a state vector a ∈ A. Given
B ⊆ A, let w(B) denote
∑
a∈B w(a). We also write for a given b ∈ Ai, w(b | a−i) =∑
a−i∈A−i
w(a−i, b); for a given a−i ∈ A−i, we write w(a−i) =
∑
b∈Ai
w(a−i, b).
Given this definition, let us rethink the disjoint union property. Given a set of winning
state vectors W ⊆ A and a set of losing state vectors L ⊆ A, we can think of a
weighted influence measure as a function φi of W,L and w : A→ R+.
Fix some C ⊆ A. Given two functions w,w′ : A → R+ that agree on C (i.e.
w(a) = w′(a) for all a ∈ C), and some B ⊆ A \ C, let us write
w ⊕B w
′(a) =
{
w(a) if a ∈ C
w(a) + w′(a) if a ∈ B.
Definition E.1. We say that an influence measure satisfies weighted disjoint union
(WDU) if for any disjoint B,C ⊆ A and any two weight functions w,w′ : A → R+
that agree on C, we have that φi(B,C,w) + φi(B,C,w′) = φi(B,C,w ⊕B w′).
Lemma E.2. Weighted disjoint union implies the disjoint union property.
We again write Wa−i = {(a−i, b) ∈ A | v(a−i, b) = 1}, and La−i = {(a−i, b) ∈
A | v(a−i, b) = 0}.
Given a weight function w : A→ R+ and a game G = 〈N,A, v〉, let
χp(G, w) =
∑
a∈A
w(a)
∑
b∈Ai
w(b|a−i)|v(a−i, b)− v(a)|.
Let us extend the symmetry axiom (Definition 2.1) to a weighted variant. Given a
weight function w : A→ R+ and a bijection σ over Ai or N , we let σw(a) = w(σa).
Definition E.3. Given a game G = 〈N,A, v〉 and a weight function w : A → R, we
say that an influence measure φ is state-symmetric with respect to w (Sym-w) if for any
permutation σ : Ai → Ai, and all j ∈ N , φj(σG, σw) = φj(G, w). That is, relabeling
the states and letting them keep their original distributions does not change the value
of any feature. Similarly, we say that an influence measure φ is feature-symmetric if
for any permutation σ : N → N , φσ(i)(σG, σw) = φi(G, w). That is, relabeling the
coordinate of a feature does not change its value.
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Theorem E.4. If a probabilistic influence measure φ satisfies (D), (Sym) and (DU)
with respect to some D, then
φi(G,D) = Cχ
p(G,D).
Before we proceed, we wish to emphasize two important aspects of Theorem E.4.
First, if we set p(a) = 1|A| then we obtain Theorem 2.8. In other words, χ is an
influence measure that assumes that all elements in the dataset are equally likely.
Another point of note is the underlying process that the influence measures entail.
If we assume that the weight function describes a distribution over A, one can think of
the influence measure as the following process. We begin by picking a point from A
at random (uniformly at random in the case of χ, and according to w in Theorem E.4);
next, fixing the states of all other features, we measure the probability that i can change
the outcome, by sampling a different state according to the distribution w(· | a−i).
Before we prove Theorem E.4, let us prove the following lemma.
Lemma E.5.
χp(G, w) = 2
∑
a−i∈A−i
w(a−i)w(Wa−i)w(La−i)
Proof.
χp(G) =
∑
a∈A
w(a)
∑
b∈Ai
w(b | a−i)|v(a−i, b)− v(a)|
= 2
∑
a−i∈A
w(a−i)
∑
c∈Ai:
v(a−i,c)=0
∑
b∈Ai:
v(a−i,b)=1
w(c | a−i)w(b | a−i)
= 2
∑
a−i∈A
w(a−i)
∑
c∈Ai:
v(a−i,c)=0
w(c | a−i)w(Wa−i)
= 2
∑
a−i∈A
w(a−i)w(La−i)w(Wa−i )
Lemma E.6. Let f : R2 → R be a function that satisfies
(i) f(x, 0) = f(0, y) = 0.
(ii) f(x1, y) + f(x2, y) = f(x1 + x2, y).
(iii) f(x, y1) + f(x, y2) = f(x, y1 + y2).
Then there is some constant c such that f(x, y) = cxy.
Proof. First, we show that f(rx, y) = rf(x, y) for all r ∈ R. Given any n ∈ N,
f(nx, y) = nf(x, y) by property (2). Similarly, f( x
n
, y) = 1
n
f(x, y). Thus, for
any rational number q ∈ Q, we have f(qx, y) = f(x, qy) = qf(x, y). Now, take
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any real number r ∈ R. There exists a sequence of rational numbers (qn)∞n=1 such
that limn→∞ qn = r. Thus, f(rx, y) = limn→∞ f(qnx, y) = limn→∞ qnf(x, y) =
rf(x, y) (and similarly f(x, ry) = rf(x, y)).
Let us observe the partial derivatives of f at x 6= 0:
∂f
∂x
(x∗, y∗) = lim
ε→0
f(x∗ + ε, y∗)− f(x∗, y∗)
ε
= lim
ε→0
(x
∗+ε
x∗
− 1)f(x∗, y∗)
ε
=
f(x∗, y∗)
x∗
and similarly ∂f
∂y
(x∗, y∗) = f(x
∗,y∗)
y∗
. We obtain the following differential equation:
x∂f
∂x
− f = 0. Its only solution is f(x, y) = g(y)x+h(y). However, since f(0, y) = 0
for all y, we get that h(y) ≡ 0. Similarly, f(x, y) = k(x)y. Putting it all together, we
get that f(x, y) = cxy.
Lemma E.7. If a value φ satisfies the (WDU) and (Sym-w) property, then it agrees
with χp on any game G = 〈{i}, Ai, v〉 with any weight function w : Ai → R+
Proof. Let us write Wi and Li to be the winning and losing states in Ai. By state
symmetry we know that φ is only a function of (w(b))b∈Wi and (w(b))b∈Li . By the
weighted disjoint union property, we know that
φi((w(b))b∈Wi , (w(b))b∈Li) =
∑
b∈Wi
∑
c∈Li
φi(w(b), w(c)).
Using the (WDU) property, we know that the following holds for single-feature games
with only two states. Given x1, x2, y ∈ R+, the following holds:
φi(x1 + x2, y) =φi(x1, y) + φi(x2, y)
φi(y, x1 + x2) =φi(y, x1) + φi(y, x2)
By Lemma E.7, we know that φi(x, y) = cxy = cχpi (x, y). In particular, this implies
that φi(G, w) = χpi (G, w), and we are done.
Proof of Theorem E.4. First, we note that χp satisfies (D), (Sym-w) and (WDU) (this
is an easy exercise). We write W to be the winning state vectors in A and L to be
the losing state vectors in A. Now, if either w(W ) = 0 or w(L) = 0, any influence
measure that satisfies (D) assigns a value of zero to all i ∈ N , and the claim trivially
holds. Thus, we assume that w(W ), w(L) > 0.
Next, according to the (DU) property, we can write
φi(W,L,w) =
∑
a−i∈A−i
φi(Wa−i , La−i , w).
The argument is the same as the one used for the decomposition of χ in Theorem 2.8.
By the above lemmas, φi(Wa−i , La−i, w) = Cχ
p
i (Wa−i , La−i, w). Note that by fea-
ture symmetry, it must be the case that the constant C is independent of i.
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F Generalized Distance Measures
Suppose that we have a set of feature vectors B ⊆ A. In previous sections we had
assumed that there was some function v : A → {0, 1} that classified a vector as
either having a value of 0 or a value of 1. We then proceeded to provide an axiomatic
characterization of influence measures in such settings. Influence was largely based on
the following notion: a feature i ∈ N can influence the vector a ∈ A, if |v(a−i, b) −
v(a)| = 1. Let us now consider a more general setting; instead of defining a classifier
over data points, we have some semi-distance measure over the vectors. Recall that a
pseudo-distance measure is a function d : A× A→ R that satisfies all of the distance
axioms, but d(a,b) = 0 does not necessarily imply that a = b. Given some pseudo-
distance measure d overA, rather than measuring influence by the measure |v(a−i, b)−
v(a)|, we measure influence by d((a−i, b), a).
We observe that if d(a,b) ∈ {0, 1} for all a,b ∈ A, then we revert to the original
setting.
Given a pseudo-distance measure d over A and a dataset B ⊆ A, let us define
Pd(B) to be the partition of B into the equivalence classes defined by a ∼ b iff
d(a,b) = 0. In other words, Pd(B) is the clustering of B into points that are of equal
distance to each other. Fixing a pseudo-distance d, we provide the following extensions
of the axioms defined in Section 2.
We keep the notion of symmetry used in Section 2 (Definition 2.1): an influence
measure satisfies symmetry if it is invariant under coordinate permutations, both for
individual features (e.g. renaming males to females and vice versa should not change
the influence of any feature), and between the features (e.g. renaming gender and age
should not change feature influence). We do, however, adopt more general definitions
of the dummy and disjoint union properties.
Definition F.1 (d-Dummy). We say that an influence measure satisfies the d-Dummy
property if φi(B) = 0 whenever d((a−i, b), a) = 0 for all a ∈ B and all b ∈ Ai such
that (a−i, b) ∈ B.
Definition F.2 (Feature Independence). Let B ⊆ A be a dataset, and let B(a−i) =
{b ∈ B | b−i = a−i}. An influence measure satisfies feature independence (FD) if
φi(B) =
∑
a−i∈A−i
φi(B(a−i)).
Definition F.3 (d-Disjoint Union). LetB ⊆ A be a dataset, and let B = {B1, . . . , Bm}
be the equivalence classes of B according to the pseudo-distance d. An influence
measure φ satisfies the d-disjoint union, if for any j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, any partition C,C ′
of Bj satisifies
φi(B1, . . . , Bm) = φi(B−j , C) + φi(B−j , C
′)− φi(B−j).
Finally, the following axiom requires that in very minimal settings, a feature’s in-
fluence should agree with d.
Definition F.4 (Agreement with Distance).
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Given a dataset B ⊆ A, define
χdi (B) =
∑
a∈B
∑
b∈Ai:(a−i,b)∈B
d((a−i, b), a) (20)
Lemma F.5. Let B be a dataset of single-feature points. Then if φ satisfies, d-(D),
d-(DU), (Sym), and (AD), then φ(B) = χd(B)
Proof Sketch. We partitionB into its equivalence classes according to d, B = {B1, . . . , Bm}.
In an argument similar to Lemma 2.7, we can show that the symmetry axiom implies
that φ is a function of |B1|, . . . , |Bm|. Let wj = |Bj |; employing the d-disjoint union
property and the dummy property, we obtain that there exists some m ×m matrix D′
such that φ(B) = wTD′w, and D′ is 0 on the diagonal, non-negative, and symmetric
(symmetry here is obtained via state symmetry).
To show that D′ must identify with the pseudo-distance, we employ the agreement
with distance axiom on inputs to φ that have only two non-zero coordinates, to obtain
the desired result.
Theorem F.6. If an influence measure φ satisfies the d-dummy, d-disjoint union, sym-
metry and agreement with distance axioms, then
φi(B) = α
∑
a∈B
∑
b∈Ai:(a−i,b)∈B
d((a−i, b), a),
where α is a constant independent of i.
Proof Sketch. The proof mostly follows the proof technique of Theorem 2.8. Let us
write the influence of i under d to be φdi (A).
Using the (FI) property, we decomposeφdi into |A−i| different single-feature datasets.
Next, we apply Lemma F.5 on each of the datasets to show that identity holds.
30
